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 I have had a long time personal and professional interest in two related 
subjects:  pension plans and corporate governance.  My talk tonight will be on 
some surprising ways they interact and what that interaction may mean for 
corporate governance in the years ahead. 
 
 Can any of you identify the following quote from a book by a well known 
business writer, published in 1976, just before the enactment of ERISA? 
  
 “If “socialism” is defined as “ownership” of the means of production by 
workers” – and this is both the orthodox and the only rigorous definition – then 
the United States is the first truly “socialist” country.” 
 
 Peter Drucker was the author of The Unseen Revolution: How Pension 
Socialism Came to America. 
 
 This book was the culmination of Drucker’s pension socialism thesis, 
starting with an article in Harper’s in the 1950’s and frequently addressed in later 
essays. 
 
 The book is a comprehensive attempt to describe the role of pension 
plans in the corporate governance of American public companies and has always 
appealed to me in its broad scope. 
 
 In 1976 Drucker estimated that 25% of common stock was held by 
company defined benefit pension plans and another 10% in public employee 
plans, giving workers roughly a 35% ownership share.  Those numbers are 
significantly higher today.  Surely, Drucker argued, a 35% block holding gave the 
workers de facto control of American companies. 
 
 In 1976 virtually all corporate pension plans were defined benefit in form – 
TIAA-CREF’s defined contribution and Taft-Hartley plans were exceptions.  Much 
of Drucker’s analysis is driven and, in my view, flawed because he wrote before 
the era of defined contribution plans.   
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 Remember that ERISA, enacted as his book was published, and other 
pension legislation in the late 1970’s created the important pension institutions of 
401(k) plans and IRA’s, which together are now the largest asset base for 
America’s pension accumulations.  Keogh plans for the self-employed, which 
started a few years earlier, are another form of defined contribution plan. 
 
 Drucker contrasted the U.S. to European countries by calling our system 
“socialized” and theirs as “nationalized”.  An interesting distinction, particularly 
when we think of Russia.  Also England had a comparable commitment to 
defined benefit plans, with similar investment strategies, but had gone a different 
route with nationalization of their largest companies. 
 
 Drucker reviewed the history of the post World War II pension 
development, focusing especially on the bellwhether General Motors plan.  
Charlie Wilson (famous for saying “whatever is good for GM is good for the 
country”) started the creation of corporate pension plans in 1950 with strong 
opposition from the UAW.  After court decisions made it clear that pensions were 
an appropriate subject for labor-management bargaining,  there was a flood of 
new corporate defined benefit plans, over 8,000 new ones in one year. 
 
 What seemed radical in 1949, the adoption of Wilson’s plan for GM, 
copied by others, involved a few key principles, articulated by Wilson: 
 
(1) No investment in assets backing the plan should be in GM shares, or 
in GM debt.  Instead invest in other companies’ equity and debt. 
(2) Corporate pension funds should be professionally invested as 
“investment funds”.  Incidentally, this policy spelled the end of 
traditional life insurance domination of pension management since not 
until ten years later did they develop methods for investing in common 
stocks. 
(3) No investment in any company in excess of 5% of that company’s 
stock.  This is interesting as an example of America’s populist 
opposition to block holding.  At that time there was nothing to prevent 
ownership by a pension fund of major controlling blocks of another 
company’s stock.  Perhaps Wilson believed there would be a 
congressional reaction if GM’s pension plan gained controlling 
interests in other companies. 
(4) No investment should be made in excess of 10% of the pension funds 
assets, a sensible diversification. 
 
A flaw in Wilson’s bold but cautious plan, which we are now confronting, 
was not to see the long term financial risks exploding in defined benefit 
liabilities.  There was some merit in the old fashioned life insurance company 
group annuity plans that compelled total immunization between assets and 
liabilities, and total shifting of risks to the insurer. 
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 Several other interesting observations in Drucker’s 1976 book:  (1) he 
favored including municipal and state plans under ERISA, a sensible change 
not yet implemented in 2006 and (2) he had proposed compulsory 
government reinsurance of defined benefit plans in the 1950’s – which he 
claims “startled no one.”  Obviously the PBGC was created under ERISA in 
1976 as a kind of reinsurance. 
 
 Drucker has a lot of analysis of economic issues, particularly macro issues 
involving the formation of capital.  He even made some comments on the 
demographic problems he saw then.  He should be writing now! 
 
 As to specifically corporate governance issues, he had several key 
predictions (none of which have yet surfaced.) 
 
 Drucker saw a fundamental conflict in the role of commercial banks in 
asset management.  His prediction was that the two functions would be split 
apart with the traditional trust and asset management business spun off into 
separate companies. 
 
 He also predicted attempts by the government to expropriate pension 
assets, either by requiring pension plans to buy government bonds or by 
direct confiscation.  
 
 I remember reading The Unseen Revolution in the late 1970’s and being 
puzzled by Drucker’s thesis.  Workers should somehow have asserted their 
control, but they had not in any significant way. 
 
 On rereading it in 2006, I continue to believe the revolution did not occur in 
the 60’s and 70’s.  But I believe it has now started.  We will date its beginning 
with the crash of the stock market in 2000, and it is steadily gaining force.  
The implication for corporate management in the next two decades will be 
profound.  I will turn to those implications shortly. 
 
 I recommend to you a book just published in 2005 called Political Power 
and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance, by 
Peter Goureviteh and James Shinn. The authors explore fundamental issues 
on the interaction of politics and corporate governance.  But most importantly 
it provides an analysis and ingenious empirical work on how pension plan 
ownership works through the political process.  It argues that the large 
pension ownership in the U.S. has created an alliance of strange bed-fellows, 
workers and owners to challenge managements. 
 
 Let me briefly outline the thesis, how I believe it is currently being 
implemented and then hazard some predictions on the outcome of the thesis. 
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 Goureviteh and Shinn address two key questions: first, why different 
countries have different corporate governance structures and second, what 
creates change in those structures. In their definition of “corporate 
governance”, they focus on the prevalence of major block holding versus 
diffused shareholders, protection of minority shareholder rights, transparency 
to owners and the public of company operations, and the character of 
government regulation of public companies.  Corporate governance is more 
than just what Boards of Directors do. 
 
 They argue that the fundamental conduit for change arises from political 
interests, expressed as the interests of three different but sometimes 
overlapping groups - owners, workers and managers. 
 
 With three groups, alliance can be created in six ways, i.e. pick one of the 
three possibles against two with either side winning out – hence 3 times 2.  
These days reading constantly about executive compensation, most 
Americans would characterize managers as dominating the coalition of 
workers and owners.  In traditional Marxist analysis the owners always 
dominate the workers.  Managers under the standard economic model treat 
both workers and managers as “factors of production”.  Furthermore in 
looking at corporate governance the recent focus, post Berle & Means, is 
primarily on the ongoing agency problems between owners and managers. 
 
In many countries workers have the dominant role over managers and 
owners.  To most Americans this probably describes the continental 
European economies. 
 
 Goureviteh and Shinn conclude that the U.S. has developed a workers 
and owners coalition that is beginning to show its domination over 
management.  The result is that the American system displays three strong 
characteristics:  (1) diffuse ownership (unlike, say, the Japanese, Korean and 
European block holding governance models), (2) strong minority shareholder 
protection and (3) transparency.  They call our method the “transparency 
model”. 
 
This brief summary hardly does justice to the careful descriptive analysis 
of the authors. 
 
 What has led owners and workers to get together in America and also in 
the U.K. and certain small economies?   The culprit turns out to be the much 
wider use of private pension plans (and we are including state and municipal 
employee plans under “private”).  In most countries the national government 
provides substantial defined benefit guarantees and little is provided by 
employers or individual families. 
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 For example, the total value of private pension assets in the U.S., UK, 
Canada, Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland all exceed the value of one 
year’s GDP – in fact over 100%.  On the other hand in Italy the value comes 
to only 6% of GDP, in France and Germany only 16%. 
 
 In graphing the correlation between private assets as a percentage of 
GDP against a complex statistical measure of minority shareholder 
protections, the U.S., UK, and Canada are near the top; Italy, France and 
Germany near the bottom.  The positive correlation is .56, surprisingly high for 
such a matching of unlikely pairs. 
 
 A further relationship is interesting.  If a country relies heavily on 
government sponsored plans, with a larger reliance on future pay-as-you go 
government contributions, one might expect less political interest in protecting 
investors.  This does turn out to be a negative correlation, minus .39, as 
suspected – i.e. protection of minority shareholders tends to be less in those 
countries that have high reliance on unfunded national pension systems. 
 
 Goureviteh and Shinn also explore some of the pension institutional 
differences that create a strong ownership interest in workers. 
 
 Traditional employer sponsored defined benefit plans, in the GM model, 
kept the fundamental investment risk with the employer, except in extreme 
bankruptcy conditions. For example, when Enron failed, the workers in 
another company’s defined benefit plan were not hurt directly. 
 
 Under a 401(k) plan, or 403(b) – or an IRA or Keogh – the hurt was direct 
– given that such plans lodge the investment risk firmly on the worker or 
family. 
 
 It is worth pausing briefly to recall how significant the worker or family 
owned plans have spread since Drucker wrote The Unseen Revolution.  I will 
rely on a recent release by EBRI, based on a study from the Federal 
Reserve’s survey of consumer finances.  EBRI reports that 74% of American 
families had some member of the family in a 401(k) type plan in 2004 up from 
just 32% in 1992 and from virtually zero in pre-ERISA era when Drucker 
wrote his book.  Furthermore 29% owned an IRA or Keogh plan.  Defined 
benefit plan participation was down to 24% in 2004 compared to 40% in 1992. 
 
 And these plans were important to American families.  For those with 
defined contribution plans, or, IRA’s or Keogh’s, the assets in those plans 
comprised, at the median, 63% of their total financial assets. 
 
 Consider the political response in 2003 when Sarbanes-Oxley passed 
congress on an expedited basis, driven ironically by one of the most anti-
regulatory administrations in our government’s history.  I can assure you that 
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Mike Oxley, a deeply conservative republican from a red district in a red state, 
did not want his name on a bill creating a huge new federal regulatory agency 
(the PCAOB) and a tough regulatory regime over one of America’s largest 
professions, the auditors. 
 
 Surely, Karl Rove was fully aware of the political issue involved with a high 
percentage of American families affected by WorldCom’s demise so soon 
after Enron’s. 
 
 Through the political process, workers’ socialism is coming to America – 
but in a very peculiar form in an unexpected alliance between workers as 
owners and investors as owners.  This is an alliance which is demanding 
protection of investors, honest financial reporting, better internal financial 
controls, and much greater penalties for those in management not delivering 
the demanded results. 
 
 It is interesting to see other current symptoms of The Unseen Revolution. 
 
 Institutional investors have been largely passive over the last several 
decades.  It took strong enforcement by the Department of Labor, with 
aggressive audits, to persuade asset management groups that they should at 
least vote their proxies according to some set of credible standards.  The Wall 
Street rule was widely passive, if you disagree with management just sell the 
stock.  The ERISA initiative and the passivity of asset managers have led to 
the extraordinary rise to power of the proxy advisory firms.  In effect, asset 
management firms have outsourced their responsibility as owners.  
Developing an independent, thoughtful view on the wide variety of complex 
corporate governance issues is a costly matter.  Very few asset managers do 
anything of the sort.  Certainly, none of the top talent in any such organization 
would wish to devote time to the subject. 
 
 Perhaps the requirement that mutual fund companies disclose their votes 
will induce some principled review of how proxies are voted.  I doubt it.  It is 
hard work, not interesting to most investment analysts and ultimately too 
costly. 
 
 The cost is in two parts:  (1) a small cost, the cost of the people devoted to 
governance issues and (2) a very large cost, that of offending important 
clients of the asset management firm.  The SEC has noted the latter conflict.  
Gourevitech and Shinn have a nice and very accurate quote of Bob Monks, 
the maverick Republican who has campaigned for decades for better 
corporate governance activism by institutions: “the trustees of private pension 
plans are appointed by the plans’ sponsoring companies, which are anxious 
to avoid a reputation for activism – as are the money managers to whom the 
trustees often delegate their buying decisions.  In extreme cases, activism 
invites reprisal; in more moderate circumstances, it would tend to make them 
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“unclubbable” in a world where lucrative management contracts are available 
only to those who “go along to get along”.  
 
 For a simple illustration, there is a key question to ask.  Why haven’t any 
of the firms, investment management responsible for hundreds of billions in 
ERISA assets, ever filed a proxy resolution that was opposed by 
management?  There are other similar questions one might ask. 
 
 But the tide is shifting.  Clearly retirees in the 21st century will have to 
develop investment balances to finance an ever rising percentage of their 
retirement income.  The statistics EBRI reported will become more dramatic 
in the several decades ahead.  Asset managers will be forced to respond. 
 
 But let me conclude with some ideas about how this coalition of workers 
and owners may force management to change. 
 
 First I think we will continue to have deep political support for tough 
regulation of public companies, and eventually even further regulation of 
institutional investors.  We see this political effect vividly now in the problem 
of hostile juries.  Huge settlements have been reached rather than risking a 
jury trial on complex financial transactions.  American business is simply not 
trusted – reputations of companies and CEOs are at a dangerously low level.  
Too many people on juries see their 401(k) retirement plans affected by 
alleged corporate misdeeds. 
 
 Secondly, executive compensation is going to be an extremely 
contentious battleground.  We may end up moving to the British model where 
shareholders have a much stronger role in limiting executive compensation – 
and the British institutions  have been effective.  I suspect this issue ultimately 
will be resolved in congress. 
 
 Thirdly, there will be significant changes on how directors are elected.  
The majority rule will doubtless replace plurality voting, whether adopted 
voluntarily or through changes in Delaware law or even exchange listing 
requirements.  But there will be follow on changes. 
 
 Fourth, transparency to investors will go to extremes – to levels that will 
appear absurd to many of us.  Some think the long overdue SEC proposed 
disclosure requirements on executive compensation go too far.  But consider 
another example, will workers and owners continue to let corporate 
philanthropy continue at all or will the disclosure requirements make every gift 
subject to exhaustive conflict of interest disclosures?  Will all potential 
lobbying expenses require disclosure? 
 
 Obviously owners and workers will care deeply about financial reporting – 
at least integrity if not clarity. 
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 Fifth and finally, I think we will see a change in the kind of institutions that 
are included under the name of “corporate activists”, a somewhat 
disreputable name.  We will still have to deal with four groups who give 
corporate activists a bad name:  (1) special interest groups; (2) certain crank 
types, whom all of you can name, who make a farce out of annual meetings; 
(3) state and city pension plan activists with poorly concealed political 
motivations; and (4) union harassment representatives without serious 
understanding of corporate governance. 
 
 But the new owner-worker coalition will introduce serious labor 
resolutions.  The quality of the legal staffing of the major national union 
groups has improved substantially, and the quality of the resolutions improved 
– with many garnering substantial, and sometimes majority support from 
institutional investors. 
 
 And institutional investors are changing significantly.  Hedge fund 
managers and private equity firms bring sophisticated, economically oriented 
advocacy into the camp of activists.  And surely the pressures will mount on 
asset managers to take a more effective role – with substantial commitment 
of resources.  If they do not do so one can predict some form of reaction from 
the owner & worker coalition – either through political force or direct pressure 
on firms.  Perhaps Peter Drucker’s prediction of fifty years ago will finally 
come true – that the asset management function will have the same kind of 
independence standards for example, as currently applied to auditors.  Will 
firms administering 401(k) plans have to be separated from the investment 
management functions?  Drucker’s prediction was limited to bank trust 
departments – the concept is the same in 2006 but the relevant institutional 
set up is dramatically different. 
 
 There are also some issues on which workers and owners will not agree.  
Investor owners will never be persuaded to support unionization of 
workforces, or support of open ended benefit commitments such as the 
original GM plan. 
  
At a more subtle level, workers will oppose efforts to open up the market 
for corporate control, something which is in the interest of investors. – that 
market can endanger jobs, in attrition or elimination of business units.  
Obviously non-worker owners would support a flourishing market.  But on this 
issue it appears that managers have dominated since their focused efforts on 
individual states have not been effectively blocked by more nationally oriented 
investors.  Poison pills are clearly here to stay along with local protective 
provisions for state domiciled companies. 
 
 There are other consequences one might suggest.  And I am sure when I 
reread this five or ten years from now there will be lots of surprises. 
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 In conclusion, Peter Drucker’s predictions were made a bit early.  And 
institutional changes that he did not foresee, especially the dramatic shift to 
defined contribution plans, have created an American socialism that seems 
pretty benign compared to the fears that the word socialism raises.  Our 
private sector remains dominant but a new coalition of owners and workers 
will assert much more control over how public companies are managed. 
 
 Maybe once again American capitalism has found a balanced and 
acceptable solution.  But the days of imperial CEO’s are numbered.  The days 
of managed earnings are certainly gone.  Stock option plans have seen their 
heyday.  Those who manage money will be held to much higher standards.  It 
is hard to be against those values of this worker-owner coalition. 
